

Message Text

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 133216

FOLLOWING REPEAT OTTAWA 1929 ACTION SECSTATE INFO MBFR
VIENNA GENEVA MOSCOW 19 JUNE 1974. QUOTE:

S E C R E T OTTAWA 1929

SECTO 117

DEPT ALSO PASS ROUTINE INFO ALL NATO CAPS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP: (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: NATO MIN OTTAWA: REGULAR SESSION, AFTERNOON JUNE 18--
MIDDLE EAST

1. FOLLOWING PRIVATE SESSION, AFTERNOON SESSION DEALT EXCLUSIVELY
WITH MIDDLE EAST AND WAS LED OFF BY SECRETARY, ON THE UNDER-
STANDING THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD CONFINE COMMENTS TO PRESS TO
SAYING SECRETARY GAVE GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MIDDLE EAST
SITUATION.

2. SECRETARY STATED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO COMPARE
THE SITUATION NOW WITH THAT OF LAST OCTOBER. THEN A
UNITED ARAB BLOC BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION WAS PRESSING
WESTERN COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE US ACROSS A WIDE RANGE
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OF ISSUES, USING OIL AS A WEAPON. THIS LED TO BITTER
DEBATE AND PROFOUND CONCERN IN ALLIANCE COUNTRIES. EARLY
IN NOVEMBER THE US ADOPTED A NEW APPROACH BASED ON THE
PROPOSITION THAT ONLY THE US WOULD STATE OBJECTIVES

THAT COULD IN FACT BE REALIZED. THEREFORE, THE US AVOIDED AND HAD CONTINUED TO AVOID A DEFINITION OF ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. SECRETARY SAID, WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIETS, THAT US COULD ALWAYS PRODUCE AT LEAST A MILITARY STALEMATE AND THAT SOVIET POWER HAD NEVER BEEN USED IN MIDDLE EAST. HE CONTINUED THAT US HAD NOT FOUND IT NECESSARY TO AGREE WITH ALL ARAB PROPOSITIONS OR POSITIONS AND HAD CHOSEN TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP, AIMING AT ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES.

3. THERE HAD BEEN A STARTLING CHANGE IN EGYPTIAN ORIENTATION AND THE CHANGE IN ORIENTATION ON THE PART OF SYRIA HAD BEEN ALMOST AS REMARKABLE. FIRST, THE SYRIANS HAD REGARDED THEMSELVES AS THE VANGUARD OF THE ARAB CAUSE. NOW THEY HAD AGREED TO A DISENGAGEMENT LINE ON WHAT THEY REGARDED AS THEIR OWN TERRITORY, AS WELL AS TO A LIMITATION OF THEIR FORCES AND A UN PRESENCE. EGYPT TODAY WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW A STEP BY STEP APPROACH AND SO WAS SYRIA, THOUGH SLIGHTLY LESS PREDICTABLY.

4. PROGRESS, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WAS NOT FREE FROM PROBLEMS AND HE IDENTIFIED THREE AS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT: BOUNDARIES, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND JERUSALEM. THE US HAD NOT SOUGHT TO INTERPRET RESOLUTION 242-- WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO ITS ROLE AS MEDIATOR-- BUT THIS ISSUE COULD NOT BE AVOIDED THOUGH IT WOULD CLEARLY BE PREFERABLE TO FACE IT AT A LATER STAGE. THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN PROBLEM WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN USUAL BECAUSE OF THE SLENDER MAJORITY OF TWO IN THE CURRENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THAT PROBLEM WOULD COME DOWN TO ISRAEL HAVING TO DEAL WITH JORDAN OR TO FACE THE ORGANIZED STRENGTH OF THE ARABS IN SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIANS. IN VIEW OF THESE DIFFICULTIES THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD BE REOPENED BEFORE EARLY SEPTEMBER.

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5. TO THE SOVIET UNION RECENT EVENTS MUST HAVE BEEN PROFOUNDLY UNSETTLING. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD DRAMATICALLY DECLINED. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHEN HE SAW GROMYKO ON HIS LAST DAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IT APPEARED CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NOT GIVEN HIM MUCH, IF ANY, INFORMATION. TO THE CREDIT OF THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, IT COULD BE SAID THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THEIR EFFORTS AT STRENGTHENING THE SOVIET-US RELATIONSHIP, AND THAT THEY HAD NOT ACTUALLY THWARTED PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IN TURN IT WAS NOT US POLICY TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR TO PUSH THE SOVIET UNION

OUT. THE US WOULD NOT RESIST A REASONABLE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

6. TURNING TO US BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT OIL WAS THE LEAST OF OUR CONSIDERATIONS. THE US SOUGHT TO CREATE A NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE ARABS TO CONFRONT THE WEST. US OBJECTIONS TO EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH LIMITING EUROPEAN CONTACTS IN THE AREA BUT DERIVED FROM A CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT GIVE DISPROPORTIONATE WEIGHT TO RADICAL ARAB ELEMENTS, LEADING TO PRESSURES ON EUROPE AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT IT WAS IN THE US INTEREST TO HAVE OTHER COUNTRIES PRESENT IN THE AREA AND UNDERLINED HOW DESIRABLE HE FELT IT WAS THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THE US NOT BE THE SOVIET UNION.

7. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT, IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE DECLARATION WHICH HAD JUST BEEN APPROVED, THE US WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE COUNCIL WITH THE ALLIES IN AN AREA WHICH WAS SO SENSITIVE AND THE DANGER SO GREAT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HARMONIZE PURPOSES. THE MIDDLE EAST FACED THE BEST OPPORTUNITY IN 25 YEARS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY AND THE WEST FACED THE BEST
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PROSPECT IN 15 YEARS OF RESTORING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE AREA BY CREATING A NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS.

8. REFERRING TO OFFICIAL FRENCH STATEMENT ON ME, SAUVAGNARGUES (FRANCE) VOICED FRENCH ADMIRATION FOR SECRETARY'S SUCCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUT OF THIS FIRST STEP A DIALOGUE WOULD EMERGE LEADING TOWARDS A PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SECRETARY ABOUT EUROPEAN DIALOGUE WITH THE ARABS HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THIS WOULD BE BASED ONLY ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION, NOTING THAT THE WEST EUROPEANS HAD A LONG HISTORY OF FRIENDSHIP AND INTEREST IN THE AREA AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT. EUROPE, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN FAR MORE AFFECTED THAN THE US BY THE ENERGY CRISIS. HENCE IT HAD AN ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN STARTING UP A PROCESS WITH THE ARABS EVEN THOUGH ONE COULD NOT NOW SEE WHAT PROCEDURES MIGHT BE USED OR WHAT THE END RESULTS WOULD NECESSARILY BE. THE EUROPEANS SHOULD HAVE IDEAS AND SO SHOULD THE ARABS. SHOULD THE ARABS RAISE POLITICAL MATTERS, THEY COULD BE TOLD THAT THE EUROPEANS DID NOT WANT TO TALK POLITICS.

WESTERN EUROPE HAD NO INTENTION OF HINDERING US EFFORTS, BUT THE TRADITIONAL ROLE --ESPECIALLY OF THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS-- WAS SOMETHING THEY DID NOT WISH TO GIVE UP.

9. MORO (ITALY), EXPRESSING THANKS TO THE SECRETARY, SAID HE WAS HAPPY THAT THE US HAD REGAINED THE INITIATIVE AND ACHIEVED A POSITION OF BALANCE. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF THE US SECRETARY OF STATE TO ACHIEVE THIS POLITICAL RECOVERY.

10. DIFFICULT ISSUES WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO ARISE, SUCH AS THAT OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND OF JERUSALEM. WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD SUPPORT POLITICAL INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THIS MEANT THERE SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN THE AREA. MORO NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE
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SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT EUROPE COULD PERFORM A USEFUL FUNCTION. THIS EFFORT WOULD FOCUS ESSENTIALLY ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS, AND A EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE, IF CARRIED OUT PRUDENTLY, COULD BE USEFUL IF THIS TOOK PLACE IN A SPIRIT IN THE ALLIANCE OF MUTUAL TRUST AND OF CONSULTATION.

11. MORO EXPRESSED ITALIAN AGREEMENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE NATO DECLARATION.

12. GENSCHER (FRG) THOUGHT A EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE NECESSARY AND SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT EUROPE SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO THE ARAB WORLD. THIS DIALOGUE COULD LEAD TO A CONSULTATIVE PHASE WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY EXCLUDE EXTREME ARAB ELEMENTS. GENSCHER STIPULATED TWO PROVISIONS: FIRST, CONSULTATION WITH THE ARABS DID NOT EXCLUDE CONTACT WITH ISRAEL AND HE SAID HE INTENDED TO CONTINUE SHORTLY THE DISCUSSION HE HAD BEGUN IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE EC COUNCIL WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN BONN. SECOND, THIS CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT BE CONCEALED FROM THE ARABS. GENSCHER OBSERVED THAT IN DEALING WITH THE ARABS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY MATTERS BEARING ON THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

13. CALLAGHAN (U) COMPLIMENTED THE SECRETARY FOR DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM IN STAGES AND THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN RIGHT FOR HIM NOT TO PROPOUND SOLUTIONS BUT TO CONFINE HIS EFFORTS TO MEDIATION ONLY. ONE DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT THE PARTIES HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT FACE TO FACE. AT SOME STAGE THE

PARTIES CLEARLY HAD TO GET TOGETHER TO TALK DIRECTLY, THOUGH THE TIME WAS PROBABLY NOT RIPE YET. BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFLICT WERE NOW MORE REALISTIC, THOUGH HE WAS NOT SURE PALESTINIANS WERE YET REALISTIC ENOUGH.

14. FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT, CALLAGHAN NOTED, ALL STAGES WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE LINKED. HIS ADVICE TO THE SECRETARY WOULD BE TO CONTINUE HIS MEDIATING ROLE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. IN THIS CONNECTION,
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TIME WAS NOT ON OUR SIDE.

15. CALLGHAN NOTED THAT THE US HAD TAKEN POSITIONS WITHOUT NECESSARILY AGREEING WITH ARAB OR ISRAELI POSITIONS AND INTERPETATIONS, COMMENTING THAT IT WAS PERHAPS EASIER FOR THE US TO DO SO THAN FOR OTHERS. INTERPRETATION, HE THOUGHT, WOULD LEAD TO STERILITY. THE ISSUE INSTEAD WAS TO TRY TO PERSUADE PARTIES TO MOVE FORWARD AND NOT TO ASK WHERE EVERYONE STOOD IN INTERPRETING VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS. THE PALESTINIANS UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNIZED THEIR CASE WAS NOW BETTER UNDERSTOOD; AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS CLEAR ISRAEL COULD NOT STAND DEFEAT. IT WAS TIME TO CREATE REALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST NOW.

16. WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE, CALLAGHAN COMMENTED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT WISH TO PUSH FOR A ROLE IN REACHING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BUT SHOULD MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE. THE EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE, HE SAID, SHOULD FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF ADJUSTING THE REALITIES OF ARAB MONEY, WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEEDS OF THE LDC'S.

17. CALLAGHAN SAID HE LOOKED FOR THE US TO SHARE THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE PEACE TALKS WITH ITS ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE US WAS FULLY INFORMED ON WHAT THE EUROPEANS WERE DOING.

18. GUNES (TURKEY), AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY FOR HIS EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOTED A MAJOR CHANGE IN RELATIONS WITH ARABS. HE WAS DELIGHTED THAT THE US AND THE EUROPEANS WERE MEETING A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE ARABS WHO, FOR THEIR PART, SEEMED TO HAVE GAINED THE FEELING THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER ALONE AND EVEN COMMANDED SOME WESTERN SYMPATHY FOR THEIR CAUSE.

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19. GUNES WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEPARATE COMPLETELY POLITICAL FROM ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN ANY EUROPEAN-ARAB DIALOGUE AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AMONG NATO ALLIES. HE REFERRED TO PAST TURKISH CONNECTIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD FORMERLY BELONGED TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

20. SHARP (CANADA), AGREEING WITH THE SECRETARY, NOTED CANADA HAD ALSO CONSISTENTLY RESISTED EFFORTS TO INTERPRET SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. REFERRING TO UNEF, HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION OF A THOUSAND MEN TO THE UN FORCES ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. CANADA HAD TAKEN ON THIS OBLIGATION NOT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF NATO--A SOVIET INTERPRETATION WHICH IT RESISTED--BUT AS A MEMBER OF THE UN WHICH UNDERSTOOD THE PRINCIPLES OF GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION. FOR THAT REASON CANADA HAD BEEN WILLING TO SERVE WITH POLAND. SHARP NOTED THAT THE THOUSAND MEN EFFORT, WHILE SEEMINGLY MODEST, WAS NOT AN EASY ONE FOR A SMALL COUNTRY TO MAKE. HE NOTED IN PASSING THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION ARISING OUT OF THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN PLAND AND ISRAEL.

21. DEPARTMENT REPEAT NEA POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.
KISSINGER

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

SECRET

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